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During the 2010–2011 academic year I taught African-American History 
at Japan Women’s University with Professor Yoko Shirai. In a year ﬁ lled with 
extraordinary classroom experiences, one memory stands out, the morning 
that our class compared and contrasted two markedly diﬀ erent civil rights 
activists, Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois. Washington, born a 
slave and reared in the post-Civil War South, was perhaps best known for his 
1895 “Atlanta Compromise” in which he urged southern blacks to accom-
modate themselves to the rising tide of segregation and focus instead on learn-
ing a skill or trade in order to achieve “material prosperity.” Du Bois, born in 
the postwar north and educated at Harvard University, urged African-Ameri-
cans to ﬁ ght segregation and seek educational equality.  While I thought I 
knew which man our class most admired I nonetheless polled the students and 
their overwhelming choice, Booker T. Washington, stunned me. My home 
university, Fayetteville State University, is a historically black college founded 
in 1867, just two years after the end of the United States Civil War. Segre-
gated for nearly a century, FSU remains a predominately African-American 
college and on my campus, faculty and students alike overwhelmingly admire 
Du Bois. Although hardly an historical footnote, Washington and his Atlanta 
Compromise have faded from prominence, obscured by Du Bois’s long shad-
ow. Given my “American” experience, I was struck by the response of my 
Japanese students who admired Washington’s patience and were uncomfort-
able with Du Bois’s penchant for confrontation.1
When Shirai-sensei invited me to submit an essay for Studies in English and 
American Literature DuBois seemed a natural topic given the indelible memo-
ry that our brief classroom discussion provided. While I quickly chose a topic, 
I had no idea where my work would lead as I had only cursory knowledge of 
Du Bois’s life and work. Early in my research I discovered that in 1936 Du 
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Bois visited Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Manchukuo, China, and Japan. 
Th ese travels piqued my interest and became the focus for this essay. What I 
discovered from my study of Du Bois’s writings, both the familiar and the 
forgotten, was how deeply he identiﬁ ed with Japan and how this, along with 
a curious blend of racial and economic determinism and historical blindness, 
produced a Japanophile that embraced Japan, championed her accomplish-
ments, and defended her actions even when they became increasingly indefen-
sible. As America and Japan drifted toward the war that neither sought, Du 
Bois’s writings oﬀ ered a prescient warning to policymakers while at the same 
time fueling his isolation at home.
Th e Making of a Japanophile
Du Bois’s admiration for Japan stemmed in part from his personal identiﬁ -
cation with the nation’s accomplishments and its struggles in a white domi-
nated world. His semi-autobiographical 1940 classic Dusk of Dawn illustrated 
how Du Bois identiﬁ ed with Japan’s accomplishments and its battle with rac-
ism. “In Japan,” he explained, “the Meiji Emperors rose to power in the year I 
was born” and while the change in government heralded the birth of a new, 
modern, and powerful Japan “the United States refused to recognize” this new 
reality. Th is rejection of Japan, despite its many accomplishments, was analo-
gous to the racism which Du Bois experienced at home. Despite his success, 
and the considerable accomplishments of Meiji Japan, race made both the 
man and the nation second class citizens. Du Bois also saw Japan and his boy-
hood New England as remarkably similar societies where the needs of the 
community came ﬁ rst and where each citizen played a part in improving the 
world around him. His description in Dusk of Dawn of the close knit, almost 
Puritan community in which he was raised is far more reminiscent of Japan 
than of the post-Civil War America of Du Bois’s youth.2
Du Bois’s aﬀ ection for Japan also stemmed from an extraordinary historical 
blindness that ﬁ rst appeared at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.  Du Bois 
understood the war as a Japanese triumph over western imperialism when in 
fact the war, in which Japan gained suzerainty in Korea as well as control over 
South Manchuria, was a traditional imperialist power struggle. Du Bois’s early 
writings indicate that he could not admit that while the war may have been 
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fought for national survival, the Portsmouth Treaty was written to further the 
Japanese Empire. Du Bois also failed to recognize that far from rejecting 
Japan, successive US administrations befriended the nation. Th is support 
culminated in an unoﬃ  cial US-Japanese alliance by the turn of the century 
and consistent wartime support from the Th eodore Roosevelt Administra-
tion.3
In the aftermath of the Qing collapse in China, many Americans turned 
their attention from Japan to the Middle Kingdom but the curious blend of 
personal identiﬁ cation and historical blindness that drew Du Bois to Japan 
prevented him from supporting China’s new republican government.  Con-
ceding that a republican China might “test white supremacy,” Du Bois soon 
became disillusioned by China’s internal division and the blossoming of war-
lordism following Yuan Shikai’s death in 1916. Forgetting Japan’s own un-
happy experience with warlord rule during the Sengoku period, Du Bois 
maintained that Japan was inherently more uniﬁ ed than China and argued 
that this unity allowed for successful resistance to the West. Forgetting as well 
the considerable role that missionaries played in modernizing Japan in the 19th 
century, Du Bois asserted that the new generation of Christian missionaries 
ﬂ ocking to China were doing little more than buttressing Western imperial-
ism. Th ough conceding the many beneﬁ ts which missionary activity could 
bring, he also believed that “missionaries represent the oldest invasion of 
whites” and produced “docile Christian workers.” Th is view of an overly pli-
ant, submissive China combined with Japan’s continuing triumphs and 
struggles with white imperial powers kept Du Bois focused on Japan instead 
of on Asia’s other rising nation.4
While China succumbed to dictatorship, anarchy, and missionary exploita-
tion, Japan honored its 1902 alliance with Great Britain and entered World 
War I. Successful in quickly sweeping the Kaiser’s forces from China and the 
central Paciﬁ c, Japan faced its stiﬀ est resistance from its allies at the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference. While France sought to permanently weaken Germany and 
Wilson struggled to ensure the success of his 14 Points, Tokyo wanted to con-
ﬁ rm its wartime gains and also secure a racial equality clause in the League of 
Nations charter. Although Wilson and many white Americans viewed Japa-
nese eﬀ orts to secure the racial equality clause with suspicion, Du Bois and the 
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African-American community welcomed her eﬀ orts. To galvanize support for 
racial equality and secure the interests of both Africans and African-Ameri-
cans, Du Bois organized the ﬁ rst Pan African Congress. Made up of 57 dele-
gates, 41 from European colonial Africa and 16 African-Americans, the 
Congress sought primarily to protect the native African population from 
Western imperialism. Despite his best eﬀ orts and those of the Japanese delega-
tion, the Versailles Conference produced neither the racial clause nor protec-
tion against Western imperialism.5
Although Japan’s eﬀ orts on behalf of racial equality won Du Bois’s admira-
tion, Versailles cost her dearly among Americans, both white and black. Sec-
retary of State Robert Lansing, the one-time proponent of diplomatic com-
promise with Tokyo left Versailles disgusted by Japanese territorial demands 
while E. T. Williams, head of the State Department’s Far Eastern division, 
maintained that “the spirit of Japan is that of Prussia, whom the Japanese lead-
ers openly admire.” On the ﬂ oor of the US Senate, meanwhile, Illinois’ Medill 
McCormick denounced Japanese foreign policy for its “consistent perﬁ dy and 
aggression,” and A. Philip Randolph, the leader of the powerful African 
American union the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, concluded that 
Japan was as much an imperial power as either England or France.6
If Versailles frayed the bonds between Japan and some leading African-
Americans then the next major international peace conference, held in Wash-
ington DC between November 1921 and February 1922, went a long way 
toward restoring them. Designed as a way to contain Japanese expansion and 
protect the Open Door, the Washington Conference produced a naval arms 
limitation treaty which restricted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s battleship ﬂ eet 
to 60% of the either the US Navy or the Royal Navy. Th e conference also 
produced an end to the 20 year old Anglo-Japanese Alliance, secured Tokyo’s 
support for the US Open Door policy, and compelled Japan to relinquish its 
hold on Shantung province.7
Leading African-American ﬁ gures, including Du Bois, correctly saw the 
conference as an Anglo-American attempt to contain Japan and few thought 
that Tokyo should oblige the West by scrapping a large part of their powerful 
battle ﬂ eet.  In a November 1921 speech at Philadelphia’s Olympia Th eater, 
Marcus Garvey, the leading black separatist of the 1920s, declared that Japan 
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should disarm only after the colonial powers left Asia.  James Weldon John-
son, the executive secretary for the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), the premier American civil rights organization 
both then and now, conceded that while disarmament might beneﬁ t Tokyo, 
Japan faced a wall of race-based opposition which made the policy dangerous. 
Du Bois’s thinking clearly paralleled both Garvey’s and Johnson’s but both his 
arguments and prose were far more strident. Writing in the January 1922 edi-
tion of the NAACP magazine Th e Crisis, Du Bois maintained that Japan could 
not aﬀ ord to disarm because it could trust neither British nor American mo-
tives. Like Garvey, he argued that only after Britain relinquished its physical 
hold on Chinese territory and the US had abandoned “her frantic eﬀ orts to 
force white debt slavery on China” could Japan “give up its armies and navies 
and seek the path of peace.”8
It is relatively easy to understand Dubois’s admiration for Japan up to the 
Washington Conference and for several years thereafter. As a man of letters, 
Du Bois appreciated Meiji Japan’s near universal literacy and commitment to 
higher education. Given America’s traditional support for the underdog, Ja-
pan’s victory over its mammoth neighbors were likewise welcomed. And as an 
African-American, the sight of a people of color humbling the Kaiser’s mili-
tary and then demanding racial equality in Paris, had special meaning. At 
Versailles, however, he saw Tokyo ﬁ ght tooth and nail for Shantung and a few 
scattered Paciﬁ c atolls while Great Britain and France dined on the carcass of 
the Ottoman Empire. At Washington he witnessed London cast aside its alli-
ance with Japan and stand by while its onetime ally lost both Shantung and 
naval parity. If success in war increased his admiration for Japan then her 
struggles at the postwar conferences hardened his conviction that Western 
racism was holding her down and that Japan could not rely on the beneﬁ cence 
of any white nation.
Th e Making of an Apologist
During the 1930s Du Bois’s personal identiﬁ cation with Japan and his in-
explicable misreading of history turned the one-time Japanophile into an 
apologist. He believed, and believed absolutely, that Tokyo was on the defen-
sive, especially in China where the West was poised to colonize parts of the 
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Middle Kingdom.  Even as the Paciﬁ c War reached its terrifying end, Du Bois 
still claimed that the root cause of the war was “the century-old determination 
of Europe to dominate the yellow peoples for the beneﬁ t of the white.” Th is 
overriding fear of Western colonial domination led Du Bois to support Japan’s 
interwar Monroe Doctrine for Asia, a policy which, he insisted, would protect 
China from Western imperialism. His fear of further colonial expansion is 
inexplicable, however, given the Washington Conference’s patently anti-colo-
nial polices, especially the new Nine Power Treaty, which pledged signatories 
to “respect the ‘sovereignty, the independence , and the territorial and admin-
istrative integrity of China.’” And while Du Bois rightly feared that Western 
powers might take advantage of the chaos and disorder that enveloped China 
after the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, the success of the 1926–1928 North-
ern Expedition, which ended warlord rule and placed Chiang Kai-shek and 
his Nationalist Party in control, should have put these concerns to rest.9
Instead of Western colonialism spurred on by Chinese weakness and disor-
der, Chinese unity, strength, and nationalism spurred on Japanese imperial-
ism, which Du Bois consistently excused. After extending Nationalist control 
to Manchuria in 1930, Chiang Kai-shek made a bid to undermine Japanese 
control in the area by demanding treaty revision. Th is show of strength in turn 
led elements of Japan’s Kwantung Army to seize control of the entire region in 
1931 and establish the puppet state of Manchukuo the following year. Du 
Bois’s support for Japan throughout the Manchurian aﬀ air was forceful, un-
failing and immediate. In an extraordinary December 1931 essay published in 
Th e Crisis, Du Bois upbraided his countrymen for castigating Japan while 
supporting a generation of American military intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere. Nearly a year later, in the November 1932 edition of Th e Crisis, 
Du Bois defended Japan by arguing that her actions in Manchuria were no 
worse than America’s long-term occupation of Haiti. While correct on one 
level, Du Bois appears to have willfully ignored the seminal changes to Amer-
ica’s Latin American policy which accompanied Herbert Hoover’s victory in 
November 1928. Upon taking oﬃ  ce, Hoover worked to end the policy of 
military intervention in Latin America, which previous US administrations 
had followed, and laid the foundations for the Good Neighbor policy.  For 
Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson, Tokyo’s actions in Manchuria 
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were doubly disturbing because they disregarded the Nine Power Treaty and 
ﬂ ew in the face of the new American non-intervention policy, facts which Du 
Bois must have known but disregarded.10
Du Bois in Asia
Du Bois’s support for Japan did not end with the passing of the Manchu-
rian crisis and in 1936 the principled opponent of Western imperialism trav-
elled to Manchukuo and then on to the Mother Country. Part of a larger tour 
which brought Du Bois to Germany and through Russia to China, the Man-
chukuo and Japanese legs of the tour were facilitated by a shadowy Japanese 
national named Hikida Yasuichi, the South Manchuria Railway Corporation 
(hereafter SMR), and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, the precursor to the 
contemporaneous Japan Foundation and the prewar period’s leading organi-
zation for the promotion of Japanese culture worldwide. Residing in the US 
since the early 1920s, Hikida made a living as a servant to a wealthy white 
family in the tony New York suburb of Forest Hill and at some point became 
a part time employee of the Japanese foreign ministry. Du Bois and Hikida 
had been in contact with one another since at least 1931 and from the spring 
of 1935 until his departure for Europe nearly a year later the two correspond-
ed regularly. During his stay in Manchuria Du Bois was the guest of the SMR 
while the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai arranged his travels within the Home Is-
lands.11
Du Bois’s brief stay in Manchukuo convinced him of the superiority of 
Japan’s civilizing mission in Asia. Certain that the seizure of Manchuria was 
necessary to preempt the Western powers, he waxed eloquently on the pup-
pet-state’s economic development, urban planning, legal equality, and lack of 
“racial or color caste.” He was also clearly struck by the number of Japanese 
leftists who worked for the SMR and made Manchukuo their home. Yosuke 
Matsuoka, whom Du Bois credited with developing Manchukuo, was a singu-
larly impressive ﬁ gure who was so well briefed about his distinguished Ameri-
can visitor that he made a point to tell Du Bois, a committed socialist, that 
“Japan, in some ways, was the most communistic of modern states.” While in 
no way seduced by Matsuoka and the SMR, he clearly was seduced by Japan’s 
success in modernizing its conquest, especially after arriving in China proper 
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where his life experience and willful historical blindness twisted his percep-
tions.12
Du Bois’s conceptions of China and to some extent Japan are best under-
stood through the early fragmentary drafts of a novel on China sketched out 
in 1935 in which he describes a nation “raped and enslaved” by Europeans. 
Du Bois recognized that Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party sought to free China 
from the yoke of European capitalism but with his death, he claimed, other 
new leaders “schooled at Harvard, Yale, and Oxford” rejected communism 
and in the process allowed Europe and America “to forge anew her industrial 
shackles on China.” With Sun’s death, he argued, China’s only hope for re-
demption and national salvation rested with Japan.13
For Du Bois, Japan alone could protect China because only Japan had “out-
fought Europe on land and sea” and had “out-bluﬀ ed them in politics.” Th is 
success, which undermined “European supremacy in China . . . by smashing 
the legend of invisible Europe,” inevitably caused “jealousy and resentment in 
China” and these feelings, twisted by the West, led many Chinese to “regard 
Japan as her real and main enemy and Europe and America as her friends.” 
Chinese opposition in turn complicated Japan’s drive to extend hegemony 
over all Asia, an eﬀ ort which Tokyo undertook, Du Bois asserted, solely to 
counter “the menace . . . [that] Europe [posed] to the Yellow World.” Th is 
menace, he believed, forced the Kwantung Army to seize “Manchuria know-
ing well that unless she did Europe would.” Seeing his own life in Japan’s na-
tional experience, Du Bois concluded that the Euro-American powers “face 
Japan with a unanimity . . . which has all of the too familiar earmarks of the 
Color Bar.” For Du Bois and Japan, the white dominated world was both be-
wildering and dangerous. Th e Japanese people, he mused, could only wonder 
why the despoilers of China had become her supporters and why America, 
which excluded Asian immigration and rejected racial equality at Versailles, 
posed as China’s defender. Japan’s leaders, he claimed, had to be vigilant be-
cause of Euro-American hopes that a second Russo-Japanese war would end 
both the Soviet and Japanese “threats to European hegemony.”14
Du Bois’s Chinese novel also displayed keen insights and commendable 
detail regarding interwar Asia. He recognized the double standard evident in 
Far Eastern diplomacy which allowed Britain to control Hong Kong but made 
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Japan a pariah for taking Manchuria. He also realized that many Western 
diplomats believed that Soviet-Japanese tensions facilitated a balance of power 
in Northeast Asia that in turn contained both Soviet and Japanese expansion. 
His sharpest analysis, however, came when he turned his attention to social 
and political conditions in interwar Japan. Perhaps because so many blacks 
toiled in unbearable conditions in the rural South, Du Bois’s novel focused on 
the plight of the Japanese peasantry, a people who “are not only poor and dis-
satisﬁ ed but are represented” by the army, which he maintained, “has become 
more democratic than the parliamentary system.” In the army, an approving 
Du Bois observed, “peasant oﬃ  cers” are “championing the farmers” and using 
“assassination and violence to overthrow the power of capitalism.” However 
much these killings undermined both Japanese democracy and her relations 
with the West, Du Bois justiﬁ ed them as essential to the class struggle. Para-
doxically, violence drew Du Bois, a man of letters, closer to Japan.15
Th e fact that Du Bois envisioned the West as China’s despoiler and Japan as 
her only savior made for a turbulent visit to China. Du Bois’s writings make 
clear that he was deeply concerned about both the great chasm that separated 
China’s rich and poor and the Chiang Kai-shek Administration’s many short-
comings.  But the most memorable moment of his stay came near the end of 
his visit when Du Bois’s well-earned, but not always well-received penchant 
for directness, led to a minor diplomatic crisis. By the end of his time in China 
Du Bois had grown certain that the Nationalists’ single-minded focus on 
Japan, rather than Europe, was the great geopolitical problem of the modern 
Far East. In an extraordinary speech delivered to the Chinese Bankers Club in 
Shanghai shortly before he left for Japan, Du Bois scolded his hosts for despis-
ing “Japan more than Europe when you have suﬀ ered more from England, 
France, and Germany.” His remarks were so inﬂ ammatory that many audi-
ence members concluded that Du Bois was a paid Japanese agent of inﬂ uence. 
Du Bois, meanwhile, left China so disgusted that he equated Chiang Kai-shek 
with Booker T. Washington and China with the insidious “Uncle Toms” that 
he so despised at home.16
Given Du Bois’s clear attention to historical detail as well as contemporary 
Far Eastern aﬀ airs, his conclusions regarding Sino-Japanese relations and his 
actions in China are diﬃ  cult to countenance. While he correctly noted that 
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European powers had threatened Chinese sovereignty for generations, he 
somehow could not come to grips with the notion that Japan had replaced the 
West as China’s greatest threat. After taking Manchuria in 1931, Japanese ci-
vilian and military strategists attempted to safeguard Tokyo’s conquest by 
creating buﬀ er states and demilitarized zones in North China. To that end, 
Tokyo sponsored Mongolian separatist groups and forced Chiang to conclude 
the humiliating Hu-Umezo Agreement in 1935, which established a vast de-
militarized zone in North China.17
While Du Bois’s curious reading of history and Asian travels reinforced his 
negative impression of the Middle Kingdom, they served to strengthen his 
decades-old aﬀ ection and admiration of Japan. Th anks to the work of Hikida 
Yasuichi and the Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, Du Bois was the center of atten-
tion in Japan. After landing in Nagasaki, Du Bois traveled to Kobe and then 
Osaka where his address, with its unctuous platitudes to Japanese virtues, bore 
no resemblance to his jarring speech before the Chinese bankers. Th e speech 
reached a newspaper audience of some ﬁ ve million and assured Du Bois in-
creasing attention as he made his way to Kyoto and then to Tokyo. During his 
week in the capital, Du Bois stayed at the Frank Lloyd Wright designed Impe-
rial Hotel and met with faculty and students at Todai, Waseda, and Senshu 
Universities. He toured Ueno Park, the Meiji Shrine, and the grounds of the 
Imperial Palace and particularly enjoyed both a geisha party hosted by the 
foreign ministry and a night at the Kabuki Th eater.18
Du Bois’s visit cemented his aﬀ ection for Japan but also put him increas-
ingly at odds with many Americans, both white and black. Even before the 
start of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 many Americans found Du Bois’s 
favorable comments about Manchukuo and Japan beyond the pale.  After 
embracing Black Nationalism in 1934 Du Bois resigned his post at Th e Crisis 
and in a clear rebuke to their former editor, Th e Crisis carried a lengthy July 
1937 speech from the noted writer and poet Langston Hughes in which he 
assailed “the Military Party in Japan . . . [for] their savage treatment of Kore-
ans and Chinese.” In direct contradiction to Du Bois, Hughes maintained that 
in Manchukuo, Japanese authorities “attempt . . . to force the Chinese of 
Manchuria to work and ﬁ ght under Japanese supervision.” Two months later, 
as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident morphed into an undeclared second Sino-
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Japanese War, Th e Crisis carried additional stories that both challenged Du 
Bois’s contention that European imperialism was the greater threat to China 
as well as one that predicted a wholesale Japanese attempt to extinguish Chi-
na’s sovereignty. Du Bois’s pro-Japanese stance was so extreme that one long-
time NAACP supporter wrote to ask him about rumors that he was a paid 
Japanese propagandist. Du Bois ﬁ red oﬀ  a terse reply in which he asserted that 
while he was not unsympathetic to China’s plight he “believed in Japan” and 
saw in her “the very best agent” for ending the Western domination of Asia. 
While his was not the lone voice in the African-American community sup-
porting Japan, increasingly it was the shrillest.19
Du Bois and the Road to War, 1938 to 1941
As the Sino-Japanese War intensiﬁ ed and US-Japanese relations deteriorat-
ed, Du Bois became both Cassandra and an apologist for Japan, the nation he 
continued to perceive as the champion of all people of color. Th e Roosevelt 
Administration responded to the war in China with a multifaceted contain-
ment policy that sought to limit Japanese expansion. Th e ﬁ rst pillar of con-
tainment, economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek, culminated in billions of dollars 
in wartime Lend–Lease aid for Chiang beginning in 1941. Containment’s 
second pillar, military deterrence, led to a mammoth naval expansion pro-
gram, the repositioning of the Paciﬁ c Fleet from California to Hawaii and a 
military buildup in the Philippines. Containment’s ﬁ nal pillar, economic 
sanctions, began with the 1938 moral embargo and ended in the summer of 
1941 when the US froze Tokyo’s assets and ended all trade with Japan. On one 
level American containment was a remarkable success as Chinese armies, un-
like 1894–95 or 1931, remained in the ﬁ eld against Japan. On another level, 
containment and continued Chinese resistance inﬂ uenced the Konoe cabinet 
in September 1940 to both join the Axis Alliance and absorb northern French 
Indochina and take the southern portion of the French colony the following 
July.20
Du Bois watched the unfolding crisis in Japanese-American relations from 
a perspective that brought both fresh insight and tired racial and economic 
determinism. As early as 1937, he predicted that US policy in Asia and the 
Paciﬁ c “has . . . almost forced [Japan] into the lap of Fascist Germany and 
32 Sidney Pash
Italy,” and ten months before the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, he again 
correctly predicted that American diplomacy would throw “Japan into the 
arms of Germany and Italy.” His conclusion that Japan sought American 
friendship but was driven into the Axis Alliance surely oversimpliﬁ ed events 
but was not incorrect. For a nearly a year the Nobuyuki Abe and Mitsumasa 
Yonai cabinets attempted a rapprochement with Washington which Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull and his assistant, Stanley Hornbeck, consistently 
spurned. Again, in 1940, as Washington ramped up economic sanctions, Du 
Bois correctly predicted that draconian export restrictions would “lead to vir-
tual and even open war with Japan.”21
Du Bois’s single-minded focus on race and economics on the other hand 
led him to mistakenly conclude that race hatred and the needs of American 
capital determined American Far Eastern diplomacy. To be sure, while leading 
policymakers such as Stanley Hornbeck had an aversion for Japan so profound 
that one colleague called it a “pathological hatred of Japan and things Japa-
nese,” racism did not drive American policy. Because race was the deﬁ ning 
factor in his life, however, Du Bois assumed that race hatred must explain 
American policy toward Japan. For Hornbeck, a Sinophile and career diplo-
mat, hatred for Japan was not rooted in race but instead in Japanese actions in 
China, violations of existing treaties, and the hobbling of Japanese democracy 
by the same military elements that Du Bois so admired.  When Du Bois sin-
gled out Henry Stimson, FDR’s newly appointed secretary of war, as one who 
“hates Japan,” he could not have been further oﬀ  the mark. Like Hornbeck, 
Stimson had a clear brief against Japan, but not the Japanese people. When 
Du Bois insinuated that Tokyo’s commercial successes in occupied China or 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox’s “love . . . [of ] Big Business,” drove US 
policy in Asia, he simply had ignored the immense threat that the gathering 
Axis coalition posed to the republic.22
While Du Bois was right about a great number of things, in the end, rather 
than soberly assess the reason for the progressive deterioration in American-
Japanese relations he could only lash out at Anglo-American Far Eastern di-
plomacy. In the ﬁ nal weeks of peace, Du Bois still reduced the origins of the 
oncoming war to economics and race. Less than two months before Pearl 
Harbor he claimed that Anglo-American “fear of losing to Japan the immense 
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proﬁ t of exploiting Asia,” rather than national security, governed American 
policy. In the same editorial he opined that Japanese control of China “could 
not possibly have such frightful results as the exploitation of Asia by Europe 
has already had.” While London and Washington frantically prepared to de-
fend Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines, Du Bois urged “England and 
America [to] get out of Asia.” Even if he could not admit it to himself, he must 
have known from his travels as well from Japan’s inability to defeat China that 
war with America could only end in Japan’s ruin. Seventy-three years old on 
the eve of the war, Du Bois may have realized that the parallels between his life 
and Japan’s national experience were reaching a terrible, futile end.  He would 
not live to see the color bar — institutionalized racial discrimination — col-
lapse and 73 years after patriots overthrew the Tokugawa Shogunate in order 
to save Japan from the West, their descendants were on the verge of leading 
the empire into a war it would not survive. Th ese realizations were simply too 
frustrating for W.E.B. Du Bois to bear.23
Th roughout the ﬁ rst four decades of the 20th century American diplomats 
approached Japan as they did any other nation. Race played a factor in this 
approach, but so too did national security, economic and humanitarian con-
cerns, and a gamut of human emotions.  Th ese myriad factors in turn largely 
explain the convoluted and often tumultuous Japanese-American relationship 
from 1900 to 1941. Du Bois, however, approached Japan from a very diﬀ erent 
perspective. For this man of color living in a white dominated nation and an 
Anglo-American dominated world, “Japan was above all a country of colored 
people run by colored people for colored people.” Th is approach obviated the 
need to critically appraise Japanese actions and largely explains W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s linear progression from Japanophile to Japanese apologist.24
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